Sentinel policies

25min
|
Enterprise
Vault

Enterprise Only

Sentinel requires Vault Enterprise license or an HCP Vault Plus tier cluster.

Challenge

ACL policies are path-based and present the following challenges:

Cannot grant permissions based on logic other than paths
Paths are merged in ACL policies which could potentially cause a conflict as the number of policies grows

What if the policy requirement was to grant read permission on secret/orders path only if the request came from an IP address within a certain CIDR?

Solution

Use Sentinel Role Governing Policies (RGPs) and Endpoint Governing Policies (EGPs) to fulfill more complex policy requirements.

Sentinel can access properties of the incoming requests and make a decision based on a certain set of conditions. Available properties include:

request - Information about the request itself (path, operation type, parameters, etc.)
token - Information about the token being used (creation time, attached policies, etc.)
identity - Identity entities and all related data
mfa - Information about successful MFA validations

Sentinel is a language framework for policies built to be embedded in Vault Enterprise to enable fine-grained, logic-based policy decisions which cannot be fully handled by the ACL policies.

EGPs and RGPs can be defined using Sentinel:

EGPs are tied to particular paths (e.g. aws/creds/)
RGPs are tied to particular tokens, identity entities, or identity groups

Note

This tutorial walks you through the authoring of Endpoint Governing Policies (EGPs) and Role Governing Policies (RGPs). For ACL policy authoring, refer to the Policies tutorial.

Personas

Sentinel policies provide a declarative way to grant or forbid access to certain paths and operations in Vault. Therefore, the steps described in this tutorial are performed by Vault admins or security operations.

Prerequisites

To perform the tasks described in this tutorial, you need to have:

Vault Enterprise binary and license key or HCP Vault Dedicated Plus tier cluster available.
jq binary installed in your system PATH.
Git binary installed in your system PATH.

Policy requirements

Since this tutorial demonstrates the creation of policies, log in with highly privileged token such as root.

The specific required policy capabilities are as follows.

# To list policiespath "sys/policies/*"{  capabilities = ["list"]}# Create and manage EGPspath "sys/policies/egp/*"{  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]}# Create and manage RGPspath "sys/policies/rgp/*"{  capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]}

Lab setup

Note

If you do not have access to an HCP Vault Dedicated cluster, visit the Create a Vault Cluster on HCP tutorial.

Launch the HCP Portal and login.
Click Vault in the left navigation pane.
In the Vault clusters pane, click vault-cluster.
Under Cluster URLs, click Public Cluster URL.
In a terminal, set the VAULT_ADDR environment variable to the copied address.
```
$ export VAULT_ADDR=<Public_Cluster_URL>
```
Return to the Overview page and click Generate token.
Within a few moments, a new token will be generated.
Copy the Admin Token.
Return to the terminal and set the VAULT_TOKEN environment variable.
```
$ export VAULT_TOKEN=<token>
```
Set the VAULT_NAMESPACE environment variable to admin.
```
$ export VAULT_NAMESPACE=admin
```

Type vault status to verify your connectivity to the Vault cluster.

$ vault statusKey                      Value---                      -----Recovery Seal Type       shamirInitialized              trueSealed                   falseTotal Recovery Shares    1Threshold                1Version                  1.9.2+entStorage Type             raft...snipped...

Enable the KV secrets engine setting the path to secret.

$ vault secrets enable -path=secret -version=2 kvSuccess! Enabled the kv secrets engine at: secret/

The Vault Dedicated server is ready.

Open a new terminal window and start a Vault dev server with root as the root token.
```
$ vault server -dev -dev-root-token-id root
```
The Vault dev server defaults to running at 127.0.0.1:8200. The server is initialized and unsealed.
Insecure operation
Do not run a Vault dev server in production. This approach starts a Vault server with an in-memory database and runs in an insecure way.
Export an environment variable for the vault CLI to address the Vault server.
```
$ export VAULT_ADDR=http://127.0.0.1:8200
```
Export an environment variable for the vault CLI to authenticate with the Vault server.
```
$ export VAULT_TOKEN=root
```
Export an environment variable for the Vault Enterprise license .
```
$ export VAULT_LICENSE=actual-license-key
```

NOTE: For these tasks, you can use Vault's root token. However, it is recommended that root tokens are only used for enough initial setup or in emergencies.

The Vault server is ready.

Write Sentinel policies

Anatomy of a Sentinel policy

import "<library>"<variable> = <value>main = rule {     <conditions_to_evaluate>}

import - Enables your policy to access reusable libraries. There are a set of built-in imports available to help define your policy rules.
main (required) - Every Sentinel policy must have a main rule which is evaluated to determine the result of a policy.
rule - A first-class construct in Sentinel. It describes a set of conditions resulting in either true or false. Refer to the Boolean Expressions for the full list of available operators in writing rules.
<variable> - Variables are dynamically typed in Sentinel. You can define its value explicitly or implicitly by the host system or function.

Note

The Sentinel language supports many features such as functions, loops, slices, etc. You can learn about all of this in the Sentinel Language documentation.

Endpoint governing policies (EGPs)

Write endpoint governing policies (EGPs) that fulfill the following requirements:

Any incoming request against the "kv-v2/*" to be performed during the business hours (7:00 am to 6:00 pm during the work days).

$ tee business-hrs.sentinel <<EOFimport "time"# Expect requests to only happen during work days (Monday through Friday)# 0 for Sunday and 6 for Saturdayworkdays = rule {    time.now.weekday > 0 and time.now.weekday < 6}# Expect requests to only happen during work hours (7:00 am - 6:00 pm)workhours = rule {    time.now.hour > 7 and time.now.hour < 18}main = rule {    workdays and workhours}EOF

Any create, update and delete operations against Key/Value secret engine (mounted at "secret") must come from an internal IP of 122.22.3.4/32 CIDR.

The main has conditional rule (when precond) to ensure that the rule gets evaluated only if the request is relevant.

$ tee cidr-check.sentinel <<EOFimport "sockaddr"import "strings"# Only care about create, update, and delete operations against secret pathprecond = rule {    request.operation in ["create", "update", "delete"] and    strings.has_prefix(request.path, "secret/")}# Requests to come only from our private IP rangecidrcheck = rule {    sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "122.22.3.4/32")}# Check the precondition before execute the cidrcheckmain = rule when precond {    cidrcheck}EOF

Note

Refer to the Sentinel Properties documentation for available properties which Vault injects to Sentinel to allow fine-grained controls.

Simulate Sentinel policies

You can test the Sentinel policies prior to deployment in order to validate syntax and to document expected behavior.

Download the Sentinel simulator for your platform.

Example for MacOS:

$ wget https://releases.hashicorp.com/sentinel/0.18.11/sentinel_0.18.11_darwin_amd64.zip

Unzip the downloaded file.

$ unzip sentinel_0.18.11_darwin_amd64.zip -d /usr/local/bin

Write the test cases

Note

You can follow the instructions to write the test files, or clone the learn-vault-sentinel repository which includes the test files.

Clone the Github repo

$ git clone https://github.com/hashicorp-education/learn-vault-sentinel.git

Change the working directory to where the policy is located.

$ cd learn-vault-sentinel/sentinel

Create a sub-folder named test where cidr-check.sentinel and business-hrs.sentinel policies are located.
Under the test folder, create a sub-folder for cidr-check.
```
$ mkdir -p test/cidr-check
```
Create a sub-folder for business-hrs under the test directory.
```
$ mkdir -p test/business-hrs
```
Note
The test should be created under /test/<policy_name> folder.
Write a passing test case in a file named success.json under test/business-hrs directory.
test/business-hrs/success.json
```
$ tee test/business-hrs/success.json <<EOF{   "mock": {      "time": {         "now": {         "weekday": 1,         "hour": 12         }      }   },   "test": {      "main": true   }}EOF
```
Under mock, you specify the mock test data. In this example, the weekday is set to 1 which is Monday and hour is set to 12 which is noon. Therefore the main should return true.

Write a failing test in a file named fail.json under test/business-hrs.

$ tee test/business-hrs/fail.json <<EOF{   "mock": {      "time": {         "now": {         "weekday": 0,         "hour": 12         }      }   },   "test": {      "main": false   }}EOF

The mock data is set to Sunday at noon; therefore Therefore, the main should return false.

Similarly, write a passing test case for cidr-check policy, test/cidr-check/success.json.

$ tee test/cidr-check/success.json <<EOF{   "global": {      "request": {         "connection": {         "remote_addr": "122.22.3.4"         },         "operation": "create",         "path": "secret/orders"      }   }}EOF

In this example, the global specifies the create operation is invoked on secret/orders endpoint which initiated from an IP address 122.22.3.4. Therefore the main should return true.

Write a failing test for cidr-check policy, test/cidr-check/fail.json.

$ tee test/cidr-check/fail.json <<EOF{   "global": {      "request": {         "connection": {         "remote_addr": "122.22.3.10"         },         "operation": "create",         "path": "secret/orders"      }   },   "test": {      "precond": true,      "main": false   }}EOF

This test will fail because of the IP address mismatch. However, the precond should pass since the requested operation is create and the targeted endpoint is secret/orders.

The optional test definition adds more context to why the test should fail. The expected behavior is that the test fails because main returns false but precond should return true.

Now, you have written both success and failure tests.

├── business-hrs.sentinel├── cidr-check.sentinel└── test   ├── business-hrs   │   ├── fail.json   │   └── success.json   └── cidr-check      ├── fail.json      └── success.json

Execute the test.

$ sentinel test

Successful output:

PASS - business-hrs.sentinelPASS - test/business-hrs/fail.jsonPASS - test/business-hrs/success.jsonPASS - cidr-check.sentinelPASS - test/cidr-check/fail.jsonPASS - test/cidr-check/success.json

Note

If you want to see the tracing and log output for those tests, run the command with -verbose flag.

Deploy EGP policies

Sentinel policies have three enforcement levels:

Level	Description
advisory	The policy is allowed to fail. Can be used as a tool to educate new users.
soft-mandatory	The policy must pass unless an override is specified.
hard-mandatory	The policy must pass.

Since both policies are tied to specific paths, the policy type that you are going to create is Endpoint Governing Policies (EGPs).

Store the Base64 encoded cidr-check.sentinel policy in an environment variable named POLICY.
```
$ POLICY=$(base64 -i cidr-check.sentinel)
```

Create a policy cidr-check with enforcement level of hard-mandatory to reject all requests coming from IP addressed that are not internal.

$ vault write sys/policies/egp/cidr-check \      policy="${POLICY}" \      paths="secret/*" \      enforcement_level="hard-mandatory"

You can read the policy by executing the following command:

$ vault read sys/policies/egp/cidr-check

Successful output:

Key                  Value---                  -----enforcement_level    hard-mandatoryname                 cidr-checkpaths                [secret/*]policy               import "sockaddr"import "strings"# Only care about create, update, and delete operations against secret pathprecond = rule {   request.operation in ["create", "update", "delete"] and   strings.has_prefix(request.path, "secret/")}# Requests to come only from our private IP rangecidrcheck = rule {   sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "122.22.3.4/32")}# Check the precondition before execute the cidrcheckmain = rule when precond {   cidrcheck}

Repeat the steps to create a policy named business-hrs. First, encode the business-hrs policy.
```
$ POLICY2=$(base64 -i business-hrs.sentinel)
```

Create a policy with soft-mandatory enforcement-level.

$ vault write sys/policies/egp/business-hrs \   policy="${POLICY2}" \   paths="kv-v2/*" \   enforcement_level="soft-mandatory"

To read the policy you just created, execute the following command.

$ vault read sys/policies/egp/business-hrs

Successful output:

Key                  Value---                  -----enforcement_level    soft-mandatoryname                 business-hrspaths                [kv-v2/*]policy               import "time"# Expect requests to only happen during work days (Monday through Friday)# 0 for Sunday and 6 for Saturdayworkdays = rule {   time.now.weekday > 0 and time.now.weekday < 6}# Expect requests to only happen during work hours (7:00 am - 6:00 pm)workhours = rule {   time.now.hour > 7 and time.now.hour < 18}main = rule {   workdays and workhours}

Store the Base64 encoded cidr-check.sentinel policy in an environment variable named POLICY.
```
$ POLICY=$(base64 -i cidr-check.sentinel)
```

Create the API request payload.

$ tee cidr-payload.json <<EOF{   "policy": "${POLICY}",   "paths": ["secret/*"],   "enforcement_level": "hard-mandatory"}EOF

Create a policy named cidr-check with enforcement level of hard-mandatory to reject all requests coming from IP addressed that are not internal.
```
$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \   --header "X-Vault-Namespace: $VAULT_NAMESPACE" \   --request PUT \   --data @cidr-payload.json \   $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp/cidr-check
```
It is expected that this command produce no output when successful.
Repeat the steps to create a policy named business-hrs with enforcement level of soft-mandatory.
First, encode the business-hrs policy.
```
$ POLICY2=$(base64 -i business-hrs.sentinel)
```

Create the API request payload to create a policy named business-hrs with enforcement level of soft-mandatory.

$ tee bus-hrs-payload.json <<EOF{   "policy": "${POLICY2}",   "paths": ["kv-v2/*"],   "enforcement_level": "soft-mandatory"}EOF

Create a policy named business-hrs.

$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \   --header "X-Vault-Namespace: $VAULT_NAMESPACE" \   --request PUT \   --data @bus-hrs-payload.json \   $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp/business-hrs

You can list the EGPs that were created.

$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \   --header "X-Vault-Namespace: $VAULT_NAMESPACE" \   --request LIST \   --silent \   $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp | jq

NOTE: This example uses jq to process the JSON output for readability.

Successful output:

{   "request_id": "a5cc3510-37eb-abeb-aff1-64c09265b45e",   "lease_id": "",   "renewable": false,   "lease_duration": 0,   "data": {      "key_info": {         "business-hrs": [         {            "path": "kv-v2/",            "glob": true         }         ],         "cidr-check": [         {            "path": "secret/",            "glob": true         }         ]      },      "keys": [         "business-hrs",         "cidr-check"      ]   },   "wrap_info": null,   "warnings": null,   "auth": null}

Store the Base64 encoded cidr-check.sentinel policy in an environment variable named POLICY.
```
$ POLICY=$(base64 -i cidr-check.sentinel)
```

Create the API request payload.

$ tee cidr-payload.json <<EOF{   "policy": "${POLICY}",   "paths": ["secret/*"],   "enforcement_level": "hard-mandatory"}EOF

Create a policy named cidr-check with enforcement level of hard-mandatory to reject all requests coming from IP addressed that are not internal.
```
$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \      --request PUT \      --data @cidr-payload.json \      $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp/cidr-check
```
It is expected that this command produce no output when successful.
Repeat the steps to create a policy named business-hrs with enforcement level of soft-mandatory.
First, encode the business-hrs policy.
```
$ POLICY2=$(base64 -i business-hrs.sentinel)
```

Create the API request payload to create a policy named business-hrs with enforcement level of soft-mandatory.

$ tee bus-hrs-payload.json <<EOF{   "policy": "${POLICY2}",   "paths": ["kv-v2/*"],   "enforcement_level": "soft-mandatory"}EOF

Create a policy named business-hrs.

$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \      --request PUT \      --data @bus-hrs-payload.json \      $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp/business-hrs

You can list the EGPs that were created.

$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \      --request LIST \      --silent \      $VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/policies/egp | jq

Note

This example uses jq to process the JSON output for readability.

Successful output:

{   "request_id": "a5cc3510-37eb-abeb-aff1-64c09265b45e",   "lease_id": "",   "renewable": false,   "lease_duration": 0,   "data": {      "key_info": {         "business-hrs": [         {            "path": "kv-v2/",            "glob": true         }         ],         "cidr-check": [         {            "path": "secret/",            "glob": true         }         ]      },      "keys": [         "business-hrs",         "cidr-check"      ]   },   "wrap_info": null,   "warnings": null,   "auth": null}

Open a web browser and launch the Vault UI (e.g. $VAULT_ADDR/ui) and then login.

Select Policies and select the Endpoint Governing Policies tab.
Select Create EGP policy.
Enter business-hrs in the Name field.

Enter the business-hrs.sentinel policy Policy editor.

import "time"# Expect requests to only happen during work days (Monday through Friday)# 0 for Sunday and 6 for Saturdayworkdays = rule {   time.now.weekday > 0 and time.now.weekday < 6}# Expect requests to only happen during work hours (7:00 am - 6:00 pm)workhours = rule {   time.now.hour > 7 and time.now.hour < 18}main = rule {   workdays and workhours}

Tip

You can review an example policy by clicking the example template link under the Policy textbox.

Select soft-mandatory from the Enforcement level drop-down list.
Enter kv-v2/* in the Paths field, and then click Create Policy.
Select Endpoint Governing Policies again, and then Create EGP policy.
Enter cidr-check in the Name field.
Enter the cidr-check.sentinel policy in the Policy editor.
Leave the Enforcement level as hard-mandatory, and enter secret/* in the Paths field.
Click Create Policy.

Note

Unlike ACL policies, EGPs are a prefix walk which allows policies to be applied at various points at Vault API. If you have EGPs tied to "secret/orders", "secret/*" and "*", all EGPs will be evaluated for a request on "secret/orders".

Verification

Note

As with ACL policies, root tokens are NOT subject to Sentinel policy checks. Therefore, use a non-root token for verification test. For HCP Vault Dedicated, the admin token is subjet to Sentinel policy checks.

Create a tester policy which allows to operates on the secret/* path.

$ vault policy write tester -<<EOFpath "secret/*" {   capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]}path "kv-v2/*" {   capabilities = ["create", "read", "update", "delete", "list"]}EOF

Create a token with the tester policy attached, and store the token in a TEST_TOKEN environment variable.

$ export TEST_TOKEN=$(vault token create -policy="tester" -field=token) \   && echo $TEST_TOKEN

Example output:

hvs.CAESIHyhJlnhp1CJ7GoFTTl4ubjOe5nNB0oTIvuAC7mPL5K9Gh4KHGh2cy5DbFQwVVB6S2szaGxscm40cEpUMFZXQmw

Test the cidr-check EGP by sending request from an IP address other than 122.22.3.4 will be denied.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$TEST_TOKEN \   vault kv put secret/accounting/test acct_no="29347230942

Expected failure output:

Error writing data to secret/accounting/test: Error making API request.URL: PUT https://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/secret/accounting/testCode: 403. Errors:* 2 errors occurred:* egp standard policy "root/cidr-check" evaluation resulted in denial.The specific error was:<nil>A trace of the execution for policy "root/cidr-check" is available:Result: falseDescription: Check the precondition before execute the cidrcheckRule "main" (byte offset 442) = falsefalse (offset 314): sockaddr.is_contained(request.connection.remote_addr, "122.22.3.4/32")Rule "cidrcheck" (byte offset 291) = falseRule "precond" (byte offset 113) = truetrue (offset 134): request.operation in ["create", "update", "delete"]true (offset 194): strings.has_prefix(request.path, "secret/")* permission denied

Similarly, you will get an error if any request is made outside of the business hours defined by the business-hrs policy. However, the enforcement level set on the business-hrs policy is soft-mandatory, so it can be overridden.

Enable KV v2 secrets engine at kv-v2.
```
$ vault secrets enable kv-v2
```

Send some test data.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$TEST_TOKEN \      vault kv put kv-v2/test id="29347230942"

If the current time is outside of the business hours checked by the business-hrs policy, the request fails.

Example output:

Error writing data to kv-v2/data/test: Error making API request.URL: PUT http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/kv-v2/data/testCode: 403. Errors:* 2 errors occurred:   * egp standard policy "root/business-hrs" evaluation resulted in denial.The specific error was:<nil>A trace of the execution for policy "root/business-hrs" is available:Result: falseDescription: <none>Rule "main" (root/business-hrs:14:1) = falseRule "workdays" (root/business-hrs:5:1) = trueRule "workhours" (root/business-hrs:10:1) = falseNote: specifying an override of the operation would have succeeded.   * permission denied

Run the command again using the policy override flag (-policy-override).

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$TEST_TOKEN \      vault kv put -policy-override kv-v2/test id="29347230942"

Because the policy enforcement level is set to soft-mandatory, the request completes successfully.

= Secret Path =kv-v2/data/test======= Metadata =======Key                Value---                -----created_time       2023-08-11T23:16:55.485525Zcustom_metadata    <nil>deletion_time      n/adestroyed          falseversion            1

Tip

If you are connecting with Vault through API, set X-Vault-Policy-Override: true in the request header.

Role governing policies (RGPs)

RGPs are tied to client tokens or identities which is similar to ACL policies. Vault server evaluates the RGP attached to the token to determine whether to accept or reject the request.

Scenario introduction

To demonstrate the use of RGP, you are going to create the following:

Create ACL policies: secrets and admin, and sysops
Enable a userpass auth method at userpass-test/ and create a user james and bob
Create an entity named James Thomas
Create an entity named Bob Smith
Create a RGP policy named test-rgp
Create a group named sysops with James Thomas and Bob Smith entities as its members
Attach sysops and test-rgp policies to the group

The sysops group has the sysops policy attached which grants permission to manage all policies. All group members inherit the group-level policies. (If you are not familiar with Vault Identities, refer to the Identity: Entities and Groups tutorial.)

Use the role governing policy to restrict access to the admin policy such that James or a user with the Team Lead role can manage the admin policy. Other group members can manage all other policies but not the admin policy.

Create the demo resources

Prerequisite

You are going to run a script which uses jq to parse JSON outputs. Install jq if you don't have it.

Clone the learn-vault-sentinel repository.

$ git clone https://github.com/hashicorp-education/learn-vault-sentinel.git

Change the working directory to learn-vault-sentinel.
```
$ cd learn-vault-sentinel
```

Make sure that the identity-setup.sh file is executable.

$ chmod +x identity-setup.sh

identity-setup.sh

vault policy write secrets -<<EOFpath "secret/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete" ]}EOFvault policy write admin -<<EOFpath "auth/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo" ]}EOFvault policy write sysops -<<EOFpath "sys/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo" ]}EOFvault auth enable -path="userpass-test" userpassvault write auth/userpass-test/users/james password="training" policies="secrets"vault write auth/userpass-test/users/bob password="training" policies="secrets"vault auth list -format=json | jq -r '.["userpass-test/"].accessor' > accessor_test.txt# Create 'James Thomas' entityvault write -format=json identity/entity name="James Thomas" policies="admin" \   metadata=role="Team Lead" \   | jq -r ".data.id" > entity_id_james.txtvault write identity/entity-alias name="james" \   canonical_id=$(cat entity_id_james.txt) \   mount_accessor=$(cat accessor_test.txt)# Create Bob Smith entityvault write -format=json identity/entity name="Bob Smith" policies="admin" \   metadata=role="Kubernetes Expert" \   | jq -r ".data.id" > entity_id_bob.txtvault write identity/entity-alias name="bob" \   canonical_id=$(cat entity_id_bob.txt) \   mount_accessor=$(cat accessor_test.txt)# Add an RGP policycat <<EOF | base64 | vault write sys/policies/rgp/test-rgp policy=- enforcement_level="hard-mandatory"import "strings"precond = rule {   strings.has_prefix(request.path, "sys/policies/acl/admin")}main = rule when precond {   identity.entity.metadata.role is "Team Lead" or      identity.entity.name is "James Thomas"}EOF# Create 'sysops' groupvault write -format=json identity/group name="sysops" \   policies="sysops, test-rgp" \   member_entity_ids="$(cat entity_id_james.txt), $(cat entity_id_bob.txt)" \   | jq -r ".data.id" > group_id_sysops.txt

Notice that the test-rgp RGP policy is attached to the sysops group (line 58).

Run the identity-setup.sh script.

$ ./identity-setup.shSuccess! Uploaded policy: secretsSuccess! Uploaded policy: adminSuccess! Uploaded policy: sysopsSuccess! Enabled userpass auth method at: userpass-test/Success! Data written to: auth/userpass-test/users/jamesSuccess! Data written to: auth/userpass-test/users/bobKey             Value---             -----canonical_id    07f6868e-8a87-5141-1828-93097f59f424id              55972826-f3c8-2601-3acf-6568273672e2Key             Value---             -----canonical_id    73decd4f-ae4c-1dc1-a1a9-a74068ef42c4id              20e36023-c181-cbbf-f225-df9592797f56Success! Data written to: sys/policies/rgp/test-rgp

Review the created identities and policies

Examine the test-rgp policy.
```
$ vault policy read test-rgp
```
Output:
```
import "strings"precond = rule {   strings.has_prefix(request.path, "sys/policies/acl/admin")}main = rule when precond {   identity.entity.metadata.role is "Team Lead" or      identity.entity.name is "James Thomas"}
```
The precond checks the incoming request endpoint. If the request is targeted to sys/policies/acl/admin, Vault checks to see if the request was made by an entity named, James Thomas or has Team Lead role defined as its metadata. Refer to the Entity Properties documentation for the list of available properties.

Review the James Thomas entity details. The entity ID is stored in the entity_id_james.txt file by the script.

$ vault read identity/entity/id/$(cat entity_id_james.txt)

Example output:

James Thomas entity has Team Lead role defined in its metadata.

Key                    Value---                    -----aliases                [map[canonical_id:5e8cba9e-b663-97e9-5e1f-b68248e53534 creation_time:2022-09-14T01:34:53.174277Z custom_metadata:map[] id:857fedd9-038b-8c16-ddff-3b891336699b last_update_time:2022-09-14T01:34:53.174277Z local:false merged_from_canonical_ids:<nil> metadata:<nil> mount_accessor:auth_userpass_fb364660 mount_path:auth/userpass-test/ mount_type:userpass name:james]]creation_time          2022-09-14T01:34:53.081739Zdirect_group_ids       [87d8a8df-cfac-f6be-0ee7-bcf227ab098b]disabled               falsegroup_ids              [87d8a8df-cfac-f6be-0ee7-bcf227ab098b]id                     5e8cba9e-b663-97e9-5e1f-b68248e53534inherited_group_ids    []last_update_time       2022-09-14T01:34:53.081739Zmerged_entity_ids      <nil>metadata               map[role:Team Lead]mfa_secrets            map[]name                   James Thomasnamespace_id           rootpolicies               [admin]

Review the Bob Smith entity details. The entity ID is stored in entity_id_bob.txt.

$ vault read identity/entity/id/$(cat entity_id_bob.txt)

Example output:

Bob's functional role is Kubernetes expert.

Key                    Value---                    -----aliases                [map[canonical_id:83e66ad6-e6ee-d6ed-8063-e88d90dd4de3 creation_time:2022-09-14T23:30:46.079077Z custom_metadata:map[] id:437cc7a4-2e6d-3b2b-0bd6-d0f57c8e3644 last_update_time:2022-09-14T23:30:46.079077Z local:false merged_from_canonical_ids:<nil> metadata:<nil> mount_accessor:auth_userpass_427c2404 mount_path:auth/userpass-test/ mount_type:userpass name:bob]]creation_time          2022-09-14T23:30:45.958557Zdirect_group_ids       [2652cb82-c798-3a42-1fc7-9c4005190ec5]disabled               falsegroup_ids              [2652cb82-c798-3a42-1fc7-9c4005190ec5]id                     83e66ad6-e6ee-d6ed-8063-e88d90dd4de3inherited_group_ids    []last_update_time       2022-09-14T23:30:45.958557Zmerged_entity_ids      <nil>metadata               map[role:Kubernetes Expert]mfa_secrets            map[]name                   Bob Smithnamespace_id           rootpolicies               [admin]

Verification

$ vault login -method=userpass -path=userpass-test -field=token \   username=james password=training > james_token.txt

Read the admin policy.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat james_token.txt) vault policy read adminpath "auth/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo" ]}

The command successfully returns the policy.

$ vault login -method=userpass -path=userpass-test -field=token \   username=bob password=training > bob_token.txt

Try to read the admin policy.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat bob_token.txt) vault policy read admin

Output:

Error reading policy named admin: Error making API request.URL: GET http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policies/acl/adminCode: 403. Errors:* 2 errors occurred:   * rgp standard policy "root/test-rgp" evaluation resulted in denial.The specific error was:<nil>A trace of the execution for policy "root/test-rgp" is available:Result: falseDescription: <none>Rule "main" (root/test-rgp:7:1) = falseRule "precond" (root/test-rgp:3:1) = true   * permission denied

Neither the Bob's entity metadata or the name matched that the main rule returned false. Therefore, the request was denied.

Read the token details.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat bob_token.txt) vault token lookupKey                            Value---                            -----accessor                       NfBU02DcEAVSJACJUkVmpOnKcreation_time                  1663124784creation_ttl                   768hdisplay_name                   userpass-test-bobentity_id                      6090ff87-e3d8-09f1-b8d8-94ec9a7bb05bexpire_time                    2022-10-15T20:06:24.77325-07:00explicit_max_ttl               0sexternal_namespace_policies    map[]id                             hvs.CAESIEZ4R6stpJNirlgggzY0SknVO9YkFbUZ8OoUsuV32tL7Gh4KHGh2cy5Bc2NYaXVOQzJVemJTRjFzU1U2d0c2bjAidentity_policies              [admin sysops test-rgp]issue_time                     2022-09-13T20:06:24.773255-07:00meta                           map[username:bob]num_uses                       0orphan                         truepath                           auth/userpass-test/login/bobpolicies                       [default secrets]renewable                      truettl                            767h44m29stype                           service

The token details shows admin, sysops and test-rgp policies listed as identity_policies. Although the sysops policy permits access to the sys/* path, the test-rgp does not permit to read the admin policy unless the entity's name is "James Thomas" or has "Team Lead" defined in the entity metadata.

To verify, read the sysops policy with Bob's token.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat bob_token.txt) vault policy read sysopspath "sys/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo" ]}

Bob can access other policies.

Challenge question

What can you do to allow Bob Smith to access the admin policy?

Solution

One of the solutions is to change Bob's entity metadata to contain Team Lead.

$ vault write identity/entity/id/$(cat entity_id_bob.txt) metadata=role="Team Lead"

Another possible solution is to update the test-rgp policy to check for Bob Smith entity name.

import "strings"precond = rule {    strings.has_prefix(request.path, "sys/policies/acl/admin")}main = rule when precond {    identity.entity.metadata.role is "Team Lead" or        identity.entity.name is "James Thomas" or         identity.entity.name is "Bob Smith"}

Now, Bob should be able to read the admin policy.

$ VAULT_TOKEN=$(cat bob_token.txt) vault policy read adminpath "auth/*" {   capabilities = [ "create", "read", "update", "delete", "list", "sudo" ]}

Clean up

If you wish to clean up your environment after completing the tutorial, follow the steps in this section.

Delete the business-hrs policy.
```
$ vault policy delete business-hrs
```
Delete the cidr-check policy.
```
$ vault policy delete cidr-check
```
Delete the Sentinel test directory.
```
$ rm -r test
```
Unset the VAULT_TOKEN environment variable.
```
$ unset VAULT_TOKEN
```
Unset the VAULT_ADDR environment variable.
```
$ unset VAULT_ADDR
```
If you completed the Role Governing Policies (RGPs) section, run the clean-up.sh script provided by the learn-vault-sentinel repository.
```
$ ./clean-up.sh
```
If you are running Vault locally in -dev mode, you can stop the Vault dev server by pressing Ctrl+C where the server is running. Or, execute the following command.
```
$ pgrep -f vault | xargs kill
```

Summary

You learned the basics of endpoint governing policies (EGPs) and role governing policies (RGPs). To learn more about Sentinel policies in Vault, continue onto the following tutorials:

Help and reference

Your First Sentinel Policy
Sentinel documentation
Vault Sentinel documentation
Security and Fundamentals at Scale with Vault
Identity - Entities and Groups tutorial
Sentinel Properties

PKI secrets engine with managed keys

Sentinel HTTP import

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